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APPLICATION OF THE MISSOURI COURT PLAN TO JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND TENURE IN AMERICA TODAY
ROBERT E. ALLARD*
I.

SELECTION OF QUALIFIED JUDGES

T HE pivotal year in the twentieth

century for judicial selection and tenure
was 1940. In November of that year, the voters of Missouri made it the
first state to adopt a merit selection and tenure plan for its appellate courts and
the trial courts of general jurisdiction in its two metropolitan centers.'

In that same year, 1940, Charles S. Desmond was appointed to the supreme
court of the state of New York.2 His appointment, however, was not made
under a merit plan similar to that which was adopted in Missouri. It was
made under a provision of the New York Constitution. 3 The section provides
that when a vacancy occurs otherwise than at the expiration of a term, "the
governor, by and with advice and consent of the senate, if the senate shall
be in session, or if not in session, the governor, may fill such vacancy as above
by appointment .... ,,4
New York, of course, had been the key state in rejecting appointment as
a method of selecting judges. In 1846, it substituted popular election for
appointment for all judges.5 New York was not the first state to make this
change. Mississippi had switched in 1832 to election of judges., But it was
the example of New York which made the difference. Within fifteen years,
less than a dozen states -had failed to switch to election and it was the
unanimous choice of every state admitted to the Union thereafter. 7
The practice of New York was also followed as regards filling vacancies
of unexpired terms created by death, resignation, removal or retirement, i.e.,
gubernatorial appointment with or without confirmation. Thus, so-called
elective states have consistently had a large number, if not a majority, of
judges initially ascending the bench by appointment.
In the ten year period, 1948-1957, more than 56 per cent, 242 out of 434,
of the justices of courts of last resort in thirty-six so-called elective states
went on to the bench by appointment. Three such courts were composed
entirely of appointed judges. Four states had over an 80 per cent average and
ten elective states had 60 to 80 per cent of their judges appointed. 8
An equivalent study of trial courts has not yet been undertaken, but
* Director of Special Projects, American Judicature Society.
1. Crowdus, The Operation of the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan, 27 J. Am.
Jud. Soe'y 166-70 (1944).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
N.D.L.
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Haynes, Selection and Tenure of Judges 100 (1944).
Winters, Selection of Judges in New York and in Other States 21 (1943).
Kerian, Injunctions in Labor Disputes: History of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct, 38
Rev. 60 (1962).
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specific instances indicate a similar condition. Eight years ago, 70 of the 78
judges then sitting in the Los Angeles Superior Court had gone on by appointment. Two-thirds of the general trial judges now sitting in New Mexico were
appointed; 19 of the 41 Colorado district judges in 1963; 29 of 36 Philadelphia
Common Pleas judges from 1896 to 1937; 42 per cent of the Wisconsin circuit
judges up to 1953; three-fourths of the Minnesota district judges sitting in
1941; 66 per cent of all Texas judges between 1940 and 1962-all these are
appointed judges in so-called elective states.
If to the number of judges formally appointed by governors to fill
vacancies, is added those de facto appointees whose names are selected by
political party leaders to run without opposition or on coalition tickets so
that the voters have no choice, the percentage is even higher.9
There has been no precise study, to the author's knowledge, of how
judges in New York have initially gone onto the bench; but, on the basis of
the evidence from other states, it seems fair to assume Charles S. Desmond
was neither the first nor the last New York judge since 1846 to begin his
judicial career by appointment.
This type of "one-man" judicial appointment was only a variation of one
of the four principal methods of judicial selection which had been used up
to 1940. Executive appointment with or without confirmation, selection by the
legislature, partisan political election, or nonpartisan political election comprised the four choices. In 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt
an additional choice which had been in existence since 1913 as a proposal.
Professor Albert M. Kales of the School of Law of Northwestern University
had proposed that an elective officer of the state appoint judges from a list
of qualified candidates selected by an impartial commission. This plan was
embodied in a State-Wide Judicature Act, a model state court system, published in 1914 by the American Judicature Society.' 0 Its essential features
were incorporated into the Model State Judicial Article approved in 1962
by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association.' In that same
year two states, Iowa and Nebraska, adopted by constitutional amendment
merit selection for all state court judges. Thus, in 1962, some or all judges
were appointed by the governor with confirmation, approval or consent by
a legislative body, council or commission in nine states: California (appellate
judges), Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Rhode Island. In addition, initial appointments in
Maryland were made by the governor, but the judges so appointed had to
stand for election on a partisan ballot at the first election one year or more
after appointment. In four states, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and
Virginia, some or all judges were chosen by the legislature. The elective method
9. Winters & Allard, Two Dozen Misconceptions About
48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 138, 140 (1964).
10. 7 Bull. Am. Jud. Soc'y 61, 84 (1914).
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of judicial selection was still in force for some or all judges in thirty-six states.
In sixteen of these "elective" states, a separate nonpartisan ballot was used
for voting on judges; in the other twenty, judicial candidates were listed
under their party designations and took their chances with the rest of the
12
party ticket.
Merit selection was used for selecting some or all judges in Alabama,
Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. In 1963, Colorado
and Florida joined this growing list of states. In 1965, the North Dakota
legislature approved a constitutional amendment providing for merit selection
of all state court judges which goes in 1966 to the voters for approval. It
now appears that not less than fifteen other states will take merit selection
proposals, either by petition to the voters in 1966 or to 1967 legislative sessions.
What is merit judicial selection and how does it work? Selection is by
appointment of the governor, but is restricted to a list of nominees, usually
three, named by a commission of both lawyers and non-lawyers, who may not
hold any public office or any official position in a political party. Nominating
commissions are usually composed of an equal number of lawyers, elected
by the bar, and non-lawyers, appointed by the governor, with a judge serving
as chairman. A description of the actual procedure has been set forth by
Elmo B. Hunter, who, as a presiding judge of the Kansas City Court of Appeals,
was chairman of the five-member judicial commission charged with providing
nominees for vacancies on the trial court of general jurisdiction in the Kansas
City, Missouri, metropolitan area:
Just a few months ago two of our trial judges retired because of
a combination of age and illness. This created two judicial vacancies.
Our judicial nominating commission issued a public statement carried
by our press and other news media that the nominating commission
would soon meet to consider two panels of three names each to be
sent to the governor for him to select one from each panel to fill the
vacancy, and that the nominating commission was open to suggestions
and recommendations of names of those members of our bar best
qualified to be circuit judges.
It received the names of many outstanding and highly qualified
lawyers who were willing to be considered by the commission because
of the nonpolitical merit type of selection involved. The commission
on its own surveyed all eligible lawyers in the circuit to see if it
had before it the names of all those who ought to be considered. From
all sources the commission ended up with fifty-seven names.
After several weeks of careful study by the commission, the list
of eligibles was cut to twelve then to nine and finally to those six
who the members of the commission sincerely believed to be the six
best qualified of all. Those six names, three on each of the two panels,
were sent to the governor who, after his own independent consideration of them, made his selection of one from each panel. His selections
were widely acclaimed by the press and the public as excellent choices
12.

The Courts, The Public and the Law Explosion 149 (Jones ed. 1965).
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from two very outstanding panels. The commission was glad to see
the governor get this accolade, but its members knew that no matter
which one of the three on each panel he selected, the people of
Missouri would have been assured an outstanding judge.
It might be noted in passing that each of the two panels of three
names submitted to the governor happened to contain the names of
two Democrats and one Republican. The governor was a Democrat.
He appointed a Democrat from one panel and a Republican from
the other. I do not think this was deliberate. I am convinced that
our plan has so proven its merit that our governor, who is oath bound
to follow the constitution, shares its spirit as well as its letter. He
selected the two he thought best qualified, irrespective of political
party.
This is not an isolated instance. Another rather dramatic example
occurred just a few years ago when our legislature created three new
judgeships for the Kansas City area to meet the increasing cases
resulting principally from population growth. The judicial selection
commission sent three panels of three names each to another Democratic governor. On each panel there were two Democrats and one
Republican. The governor appointed two Republicans and one Democrat. 13
Warren E. Hearnes, governor of Missouri, has confirmed this tendency
of Missouri governors to cross political lines in making judicial appointments.
In a recent speech, he pointed out that, "of the first 60 judges appointed
under the Plan, 48, or 80 per cent were Democrats and 12, or 20 per cent,
were Republicans before they went on the bench."'14 He went on to point
out that 70 per cent were from the same party as the appointing governor, and
30 per cent of the opposite political party.15 Governor Hearnes declared, however, that "I think it very doubtful whether the Republicans could have had
many, if any, persons sitting on the Missouri bench, if the elective system had
prevailed during the past twenty-five years. As you may know, the last
Republican governor in Missouri was elected in 1940 and then by a very
narrow margin. Therefore, on a state-wide basis it is -highly unlikely that
many of the Supreme Court Justices would have been Republican and the
partisan complexion of St. Louis City and Jackson County was such that in
these two metropolitan areas it is doubtful that the Republicans would have
been very successful at the circuit court level."' 6
After twenty-five years of experience, how do the lawyers of Missouri
feel about this method of judicial selection? Here is the judgment of Loyd E.
Roberts, immediate past president of the Missouri Bar, who asked "a number
of lawyers representing a good cross-section of all types and interests of lawyers
13. Hunter, A Missouri Judge Views Judicial Selection and Tenure, 48 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 126, 130 (1964).

14. Hearnes, Twenty-five Years Under the Missouri Court Plan, 49 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y

100, 103 (1965).
15. Id. at 103.
16. Id. at 103.
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and law practices across the state to give their written, objective, confidential
opinions to him .... Without exception, every lawyer confirmed the writer's

opinion that the plan has functioned for good. There is also a corollary to
the foregoing conclusion, and that is the almost universal opinion among
lawyers in Missouri, that the system is superior to the system," partisan
7
political election, "which it supplanted"1
These conclusions drawn by Mr. Roberts have been verified by a thorough
and detailed study by a group connected with the University of Missouri.
Although its findings have not 'been made public, some of the information
was given to Mr. Roberts who reported that,
questionnaires were sent to 3,306 lawyers in the state (roughly half of
our enrollment); 1,236 voluntarily responded. The sample taken
therefore represents about 20 per cent of the lawyers of the state.
Seventy-nine per cent of those from Kansas City and 70 per cent of
those from St. Louis who responded, favored the Nonpartisan Court
Plan for circuit judges. The sample further revealed that on a statewide basis (including lawyers from Kansas City and St. Louis), 61 per
cent favored the Nonpartisan Court Plan method of selecting circuit
judges. Another 12 per cent favored a nonpartisan selection of judges
without commitment to a specific plan. Thus, over the entire state,
73 per cent (61 per cent and 12 per cent) favor a nonpartisan selection of circuit judges. The poll further revealed that only 12 per cent
favored the outright elective process for circuit judges.
The significant figures are those from Kansas City and St. Louis,
which respectively favor the nonpartisan selection of circuit judges
by 79 per cent and 70 per cent. These are the only two areas in the
state which actually have the nonpartisan plan in operation on the
circuit court level.
We have no figures on the popularity of the plan on the Supreme
Court and the three courts of appeal levels, but it is safe to say that
in these areas, there is overwhelming approval of the plan. One hears
few objections to the plan on these levels. Such complaints as are
heard are on the circuit court level.' 8
Perhaps even more important than lawyers' opinions are those of responsible civic leaders who have watched merit judicial selection in action during
the past twenty-five years. Robert A. Schroeder of Kansas City, Missouri,
president of the Missouri Bar, quoted four representative civic leaders in a
recent speech.
John W. Colt, executive editor of The Kansas City Star, has
said: "Public pride and confidence in our courts have become a
Missouri tradition since adoption of the Missouri court plan 25 years
ago."
Mrs. Stephen D. Hadley, president of the League of Women
Voters of Kansas City, has stated: "The right of the people to determine who shall judge them is one of the most important privileges
17.
18.

Id. at 92.
Id. at 95-96.
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we possess. Under our Missouri Plan, we insure the right of the people
to make that choice, not blindly, but intelligently, on the basis of
able judicial performance."
Carl L. Stevens, Area Director of the United Auto Workers, AFLCIO, has observed: "It is as important to labor as to any other segment of our society that we have and maintain an independent
judiciary of capable, honest men of complete personal integrity.
We are extremely happy that our Missouri Plan has given us this
kind of judiciary."
John A. Morgan, president of the Butler Manufacturing Company, puts it this way: "Any enterprise, be it business, education or
government is successful if the right men get on the job and work
at getting that job done. This is one of the reasons why I favor the
Missouri Court Plan. Judges spend their time deciding cases, not
running for the next election. They do not have to worry about being
swept out of office as long as they do their job because they are judged
only on their performance. As a result, our courts are doing a good
9
job."'
While such assessments can hardly be thought of as conclusive of the worth
of one particular method of judicial selection over another, it should be noted
that an exhaustive search of the literature on judicial selection has never
revealed an equivalent set of positive judgments about partisan political
selection of judges, particularly not in New York. The best that Samuel I.
Rosenman, president of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
could say was
that any system of judicial selection, no matter how bad, will, from
time to time, produce many qualified judges-and even some outstanding judges. This has certainly been true of my own State of New York,
which still uses the political, elective system. However, the election of
some excellent judges does not prove that the best-or even that a
good-method of selecting them is in operation.
Let us face this sad fact: that in many-in far too many-instances, the benches of our courts in the United States are occupied
by mediocrities-men of small talent, undistinguished in performance,
technically deficient and inept.20
In a similar vein, Herbert Brownell, Attorney General of the United States
in the Eisenhower administration, has said: "As a matter of hard fact, judges
are in most instances picked by political leaders. This is quite obvious in the
case of elected judges. The party conventions and primaries that nominate
judges are managed by professional politicians. This is what politicians are for.
Sometimes they have good candidates nominated, but most often their favor..
shines on mediocre candidates." 2'
These are not just the opinions of lawyers. Since 1962, there have been
over fifteen state citizens' conferences on court modernization where representa19. Id. at 108.
20. Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges, 48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 86, 87 (1964).
21. Saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1964.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tive leaders of all segments of state life have been brought together to study,
discuss and assess methods of judicial selection. Over 2,500 civic, business,
labor, industrial, professional, educational and religious leaders have been
almost unanimously convinced that merit judicial selection is far superior to
any other method presently in use. Suggestive of this unanimity is the conclusion reached at the Twenty-seventh American Assembly at Arden House on
"The Courts, The Public and The Law Explosion," where over seventy such
leaders studied this problem and concluded:
A plan of merit judicial selection and tenure should be adopted in
every state and made applicable to the selection of all judges, from
judges of courts of last resort down to and including the magistrates
in lower criminal courts, small claims courts and the like. We commend
the practicable and proved method of merit judicial selection now em22
bodied in the Model Judicial Article of the American Bar Association.
They further concluded that:
Pending the enactment of merit judicial selection, state and municipal
executives should, on a voluntary basis, follow the procedures of the
merit selection plan in exercising their appointing powers.
Governors
23
and mayors who take this step are to be commended
It must be noted that Mayor Wagner has had such a voluntary committee
operating and that Mayor-elect Lindsay has publicly declared his intentions,
not only to continue this practice, but to support a constitutional amendment
24
to make it mandatory in the future.
Merit judicial selection is coming. On the basis of present indications, it
is not only possible, but probable that more than half of the states will have
some form of merit selection of judges before another decade has passed. It
is even conceivable that some form, voluntary or even mandatory, of merit
selection may emerge in the selection of federal judges.

II.

RETENTION OF QUALIFIED JUDGES

Selection is only one part, albeit an important part, of the search for
an independent and competent judiciary. Tenure is an equally important consideration. Assuming that the best judicial talent available is placed on the
bench, how are such judges to remain on the bench so that litigants, lawyers,
and the tax-paying public derive the maximum return on their investment
in training a competent judge?
There are four basic methods of judicial retention. The first is at the will
of the appointing authority. This method has never prevailed in the United
States.
A second retention method is for life, or during good behavior. This has
22. Final Report of the 27th American Assembly, 49 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 17, 18 (196g).
23. Id. at 18.
24. 49 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 156 (1965).
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characterized retention of judges in the federal judiciary and a few of the
original states. Life tenure was a major issue in the Convention of 1867 in
New York, but in spite of powerful advocacy, it was defeated. 25 Warranted by
the facts or not, there has been persistent criticism that this method not only
produces a type of judicial autocracy, but also that the unethical or incompetent judge is frozen into office.
The most widely accepted retention provision has called for re-election
of judges for short terms in partisan political or nonpartisan political competitive elections on the same or separate ballots from other candidates for
executive and legislative offices. The little empirical evidence available suggests that, in such elections, voters have neither ability, information nor
inclination to assess the qualifications of a long list of judicial candidates.
The most impressive evidence was a survey of 1,300 men and women in New
York over and under the age of 45 immediately after the 1954 general election
which revealed that while virtually all could remember the name of the
gubernatorial candidate for whom they voted, over 75 per cent of those who
voted for judges could not name one of the judicial candidates for whom they
had voted. But the most revealing fact was that 402 of the 1,300 interviewed
were from a semi-rural area, Cayuga County, and over 95 per cent of this
26
group could not name one judicial candidate for whom they had voted.
Further, judicial elections are often affected by issues entirely unrelated
to the qualifications of the incumbent judge. The late Fred L. Williams, a
distinguished Missouri jurist, is reported to have said that he was elected to
his state's Supreme Court in 1916 because President Wilson kept the country
out of war, but was defeated for re-election in 1920 because the President
had failed to keep the country out of war.
Retention in office of a competent judge can even rest on a point as small
and absurd as the name of the incumbent judge's opponent. On this score,
the experience of Justice W. St. John Garwood, now retired from the Supreme
Court of Texas, is pleasantly pertinent. Appointed to the bench to fill an unexpired term, Justice Garwood faced re-election not long after he had taken.
office. He reports:
[IJt looked like I would have no opposition-up until the last hour
of the last day for getting on the ballot, when a rival dropped his name
and filing fee in the mailbox. While over the years he had successively
but unsuccessfully run for the offices of State Superintendent of Public
Instruction and Railroad Commissioner, hardly one out of fifty lawyers
of even his own home town knew he had a law license or knew or
remembered who he was. He did not even have a law office number in
the telephone book. To this day I have never heard of anyone who
has even heard of him appearing professionally in any court. But
his name was Jefferson Smith, while mine was W. St. John Garwood,
25. 2 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York 257 (1906).
26. How Much Do Voters Know or Care About Judicial Candidates?, 38 J. Am
Jud. Soc'y 141-43 (1955).
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the latter involving all sorts of unfavorable political implications
including affiliation with the Vatican. Moreover, only a short time
previously, Texas has been enjoying a very popular movie-show called
"Mr. Smith Goes to Washington," in which the appealing young hero,
well played by a popular actor, was named Jefferson Smith. Well, they
were counting the votes for days, and but for the fact that I was then
domiciled in the largest Texas city and pretty well acquainted in one
or two other large ones, my judicial career would have ended almost
as soon as it began. The race was so close that Jefferson Smith still
thinks I stuffed some Houston ballot boxes. 27
And for fear that any reader might think that such a situation could only
happen in Texas, a highly regarded judge in the state of Washington was almost
defeated in 1962 by a lawyer opponent named Robert Kennedy. In the 1964
elections, a jurist with sixteen years of distinguished service on the bench
was defeated by an opponent whose last name just happened to be Johnson.
In some states, attempts have been made to encourage political parties
to give preference to incumbent judges when up for re-election. It appears
that this method is inadequate because it is only voluntary and appears to
be used only when it is advantageous to the party leaders. Richard Croker's
remark when he denied renomination to Supreme Court Justice Joseph F.
Daly in 1899 is not unlike equivalent reports in recent years. Croker is quoted
as having said "Justice Daly was elected by Tammany Hall after he was
discovered by Tammany Hall, and Tammany Hall had a right to expect
' 28
proper consideration at his hands.
Even if the incumbent judge is successful in securing renomination for
office, he is obligated to run for the office and the party or group with whom
they are affiliated. This "ordeal" and its irrelevancy for incumbent judges
has been fulsomely analyzed by Price Daniel, former governor of Texas. In
an attempt to justify the exclusion of the judiciary from the elective process
Mr. Daniel had this to say:
Senators, governors, and legislators must take their cases to the people
because they are the representatives of the people in making or advocating changes in our laws. Not so with judges; they are not supposed
to make or change the laws; they do not represent the people in such
activities. It is their duty to interpret the law as they find it to be and
apply it to the facts. They should be free from the political necessities
of partisan campaigns and the expense, pressures, abuse, conscious
or subconscious feelings of obligations, and the time consuming tasks
which are inherent in the usual election campaigns.
No judge can devote the full and complete time necessary for the
maximum exercise of his judicial ability when he is having to prepare for, and keep his eye on possible opponents or worry about the
effect his decisions may have on the next election. Such conditions
work against the independence of the judiciary envisioned by our
27. Garwood, Judicial Selection and Tenure-The Model Article Provisions, 47 J. Am.
Jud. Soc'y 21, 22-23 (1963).
28. Conboy, The Selection of Judges, 2 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 27, 29-30 (1925).
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founding fathers as 29
a necessity for the protection of our liberties and
of justice under law.

To permit the competent judge to "devote the full and complete time
necessary for the exercise of his judicial ability" and, at the same time,
avoid the potential pitfalls of non-accountability for judicial behavior were
the bases for the fourth method of judicial retention. As a companion to his
merit selection method, Professor Kales advocated a periodic non-competitive
re-election wherein the incumbent judge would seek retention in office at the end
of each term. His name would be placed on the ballot without opposition
and the voters would be asked whether he should retain the office. The incum30
bent judge would, in effect, be running against his record.
Such a method reserves to the voters a veto of judicial candidates based
on performance on the bench. While voters are seldom in a position to make
sound judgments as to the qualifications of a prospective judge, voters can
and have been able to assess records of judicial behavior. In 1942, a judge
in Kansas City, who had taken office prior to the adoption of merit selection,
came up for re-election. Charges were made that he had handed down unfair
decisions, played politics from the bench, and was guilty of unjudicial conduct.
Running only against his record, he was defeated by a vote of 42,000 to 37,000.31
At the same time, it is true that no judge appointed under the merit plan
in Missouri has been removed from office by vote of the people during the
past twenty-five years. It is also true that an incumbent judge's campaign
fund must include only the costs of filling out his statement of intention to
remain in office and purchasing a stamp to mail it. No judicial time is lost
and the qualified judge is not removed from office because he may not possess
political appeal or because of purely political tides.
From the very beginning, this was the Missouri experience. In 1942, the
state went Republican, but two judges of the Supreme Court, both Democrats,
were retained by two-to-one votes. Six circuit judges, all Democrats, were up
for re-election that same year in St. Louis. The city voted Republican, but
all six judges were re-elected by two-to-one majorities.3 Even in face of the
Johnson landslide of 1964, all incumbent judges, both Democrats and Republicans, in Iowa, where merit selection had been adopted in 1962, were retained in
office. This kind of security has a definite appeal to a successful lawyer who
33
is asked to give up a flourishing and profitable practice to go on the bench.
IlL. REmoVAL OF UNQUALIFIED JUDGES
The one justification for re-election procedures is that it provides a means,
other than impeachment, to get rid of a judge. Any thoughtful observer of the
29. Daniel, Lawyers Should Lead in Judicial Tenure Reforms, 49 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y
109, 110 (1965).

30. 7 Bull. Am. Jud. Soc'y 87 (1914).
31. 54 Mich. Alum. Q. Rev. 240 (1948).
32. Hyde, The Missouri Plan for Selection and Tenure of Judges, 9 F.R.D. 457 (1950).
33. 1965 Arkansas Judiciary Commn Rep. to General Assembly, Appendix Report.
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judicial scene, however, recognizes that elections are not the most economical
and efficient method of removing a judge from office when his inability or unworthiness to hold that office has been demonstrated. Mandatory retirement
with the possibility of continued temporary assignment is one effective and
necessary adjunct to maintaining an effective and vigorous bench. New York
is fortunate to be among a growing number of states with such retirement
34

provisions.

Senility, impairment by accident or disease, serious emotional problems
and the equivalent which create incapacity to handle judicial office are not,
however, restricted only to judges who have reached mandatory retirement
age. An effective method of disability retirement is also needed. Again, New
35
York has such a system in its court on the judiciary.
The same court on the judiciary, created by constitutional amendment in
1947, has power to remove a judge from office for cause. It was first convened
in 1959.36
Recognition of the need for both disability retirement and removal for
cause has led an increasing number of states to adopt such procedures. An
increasing number of states have created, either by statute or constitutional
amendment, either a court on the judiciary similar to that of New York or a
commission plan similar to the one first set up by California in 1960.37
In contrast to the typical court on the judiciary which is usually composed
only of judges and before which only certain charges can be brought by a
limited number of designated persons by specific procedures, the California
commission is an investigative body composed of judges, lawyers and nonlawyers with a permanent staff. It receives complaints from any source and
carries on confidential investigations and hearings before any charges, in the
form of recommendations to its Supreme Court, are made public. Within
four years, it had received 344 complaints and had directly caused the resignation or retirement of twenty-six judges. 38 During the 1965 legislative sessions,
constitutional amendments embodying similar plans were passed in Florida,
Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Texas. The Texas proposal was adopted
by the voters at a special election in November, 1965, by almost a three-to-one
In a recent survey of Arkansas lawyers with 10 to 15 years of practice were asked whether
they would consider becoming a judge under the present partisan election system which
involves periodic re-election. Only 38.9% responded favorably in contrast to 67% who
indicated they would consider becoming a judge under a merit selection plan where they
would only be required to run against their record without opposition.
34. Summaries of Judicial Salaries and Retirement Plans, 47 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 129,
140 (1963).
35. Id. at 140.
36. Brand, The Discipline of Judges, 46 A.B.A.J. 1315, 1316 (1960).
37. Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem, 49 A.B.A.J.
166-171 (1963).
38. Burke, Judicial Discipline and Removal, The California Story, 48 J. Am. Jud.
Soc'y 165, 170 (1965).
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majority. 39 The other amendments will go to the voters in 1966.1 0 At least six
other states have similar proposals under study.
The record of state court modernization accomplishments from the beginning of this century up to the beginning of this decade has 'been something
less than dramatic. Since 1962, however, the pace has quickened and the
scope has been extended. More than half of the states have either adopted
sweeping changes or have significant proposals for reorganization of the courts
or judicial selection, tenure, retirement or removal under serious study. There
is, in fact today, a "National Movement to Improve the Administration of
41
Justice.1
New York became part of the vanguard of the movement to modernize
archaic court systems when it adopted the first steps toward court reorganization and administration in 1961.42
Mayor Wagner's voluntary use of a modified merit system and introduction of an amendment in the last legislative session to create a permanent
nominating commission for merit selection of those judges appointed by the
mayor of New York City are, hopefully, signs that New York may also become
part of the vanguard of the movement to modernize methods of selecting and
retaining competent judges on the basis of merit.43 If, 'however, New York
is to be part of this vanguard deliberate speed is required. A growing number
of states are on the march. Unless New York acts within the next five years,
it is very likely to find itself in the rear ranks of the states which are 'bringing
their courts and their judges into the twentieth century.
39. 49 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 154 (1965).
40. Clark, Citizens, Courts, and The Effective Administration of Justice, 49 J. Am.
Jud. Soc'y 6, 8 (1965).
41. Winters, The National Movement to Improve the Administration of Justice, 48
J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 17-22 (1964).
42.

New York Court Reform Signed Into Law, 45

J.

Am. Jud. Soc'y 326-27 (1962).

43. Merit Judicial Selection for New York City Judges, 48 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 240
(1965).

